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Abstract: Entrepreneurial networks are multifunctional; they can be used to access information about technologies
and markets or to reduce uncertainties.  A network’s function affects its structure and both the magnitude and
nature of the impact that it has on enterprise performance. Networks that reduce uncertainty are small and
cohesive. They generate positive spillover effects, while having little overall effect on enterprise performance.
Networks that provide access to information about technologies and markets are large and diverse. They have a
significant effect on enterprise performance, but tend not to generate positive spillovers. Evidence from the
Ghanaian manufacturing sector supports these propositions.Contents
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1. Introduction
Social capital in the form of networks of interrelations can enhance the performance of
manufacturing enterprises in sub-Saharan Africa, thereby improving both their income generating
capacity and their ability to compete.  Networks may, however, serve an alternative function: they
may help to reduce the uncertainties faced by entrepreneurs in relation to the variability of their
incomes. In this paper, I propose that the relative importance of these two objectives to a
particular entrepreneur affects the structure of the network she maintains and, as a result, the
effect that the network has on the performance of her enterprise. More specifically, where a
network is required to assist in the reduction of uncertainty its structure will be such that it has
far less impact on enterprise performance, while generating far greater positive spillover effects.
If this proposition holds, when exploring the link between social capital in the form of networks
and the performance of enterprises in sub-Saharan Africa, we need to take account not only of
levels of networking activity but also the type of networks to which enterprises belong. Data from
the Ghanaian manufacturing sector provides evidence to support this proposition and suggests
that, while some large enterprises operate within networks ideal for enhancing productivity, the
networks to which the more commonplace, small enterprises belong have no significant impact
on their performance, having a structure better suited to help cope with income variability. 
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 contains a brief review of the literature on
enterprise networks in developing countries. Section 3 investigates the link between a network’s
structure and its ability to improve enterprise performance and reduce uncertainty. It also looks
at what type of enterprise we might expect to find in each type of network. The empirical results
are presented in Section 4. The paper concludes in Section 5 with a brief look at the policy
implications arising from the analysis.
2. Enterprise Networks in Developing Countries
In several Asian economies during the seventies and eighties and the industrial districts of Europe
and the US, networking has allowed populations of relatively small manufacturing enterprises to
contribute to and benefit from economic prosperity based on enhanced worker productivity
(Becattini, 1990, Brusco, 1992, Chen and Hamilton, 1992, Piore and Sabel, 1984, Pyke, Becattini
and Sengenberger, 1990, Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992, Schmitz, 1992a). The literature on this
subject stresses the role that networks play in disseminating information about innovations,
lowering transactions costs, increasing the potential for the division of labour between enterprises
and fostering collective action. It also stresses the importance of incremental rather than radical
changes in technology as a foundation for productivity enhancement.
More recently researchers have asked whether this literature contains lessons relevant to
manufacturing sectors in the developing world. In an effort to answer this question they have
employed a case study methodology to look at enterprise clusters, i.e., ‘group[s] of producers
making the same or similar things in close proximity to each other’ (Schmitz, 1992b). Case studies
have now been conducted in a significant number of developing countries including Brazil
(Schmitz, 1995a), Burkina Faso (van Dijk, 1992), Ghana (Dawson, 1992), India (Cawthorn,
1993, Holmström, 1993), Kenya (Livingstone, 1991, Sverrisson, 1992), Mexico (Rabellotti,2
1995), Nigeria (Brautigam, 1997), Peru (Villaran, 1993), Tanzania (Aeroe, 1992), Sudan
(Hansohm, 1992) and Zimbabwe (Sverrisson, 1992, Rasmussen, 1992). These studies detail the
structure, history and functioning of the clusters upon which they focus. In addition, reviews of
the literature as a whole have facilitated the identification of more general patterns. They find that,
while clustering is commonplace throughout the developing world, well developed networks of
interrelations between enterprises and consequent instances of cooperative behaviour are rare
(Nadvi and Schmitz, 1994). They also find support for the hypothesis put forward by Schmitz
(1989, 1995b), that while clustering can give rise to external economies it is networks and the
joint action they facilitate that contributes most to competitiveness. With respect to the functions
that networks perform, flows of both technical and market information, equipment sharing and,
to a lesser extent, order-sharing are frequently observed. However, highly developed inter-firm
divisions of labour, subcontracting and cases where technical information flows have resulted in
ongoing technical innovation tend only to be observed in the more advanced clusters of South
East Asia and Latin America. 
While the case study approach facilitates detailed investigations into the nature of the networks
and the linkages of which they are comprised (Schmitz, 1982, Boomgard, Davies, Haggblade and
Mead, 1992), it does have its limitations. As Schmitz (1995b) pointed out ‘it tends to blunt the
search for general principles, broader categories and theorisation’ (p. 533). This is aggravated by
a tendency on the part of researchers to study clusters that have in some way already made a name
for themselves by growing, moving into export markets, innovating or by sustaining a large
number of urban poor through a time of crisis. The aim of this paper is to identify general patterns
linking enterprise type and network function, structure and effect. For this purpose cross-section
analysis based on a sample of enterprises drawn from an entire manufacturing sector is more
appropriate. Such an approach has already provided evidence of the role that networks play in the
determination of suppliers credit (Fafchamps, 1996a) and the determination of enterprise
performance and growth potential (Barr, 1997).
3. Networking to Improve Enterprise Performance and Reduce Uncertainty 
Networks can affect enterprise performance directly by providing entrepreneurs with information
about the world, especially about technologies and markets. Increases in the amount of technical
information available to a workforce will have a direct effect on its productivity. Information
about output markets, how they function and the standards to which they comply, may help
enterprises become more competitive and may also have a direct effect on productivity, especially
if an enterprise is operating below full capacity. Finally, increased access to information about
input markets may reduce costs or improve output quality. 
An entrepreneur whose networking objective is to maximize access to such information will wish
to be part of a far reaching network. She will face high returns to maintaining a large, diverse set
of contacts. She may also benefit from maintaining contacts who themselves maintain large and
diverse sets of contacts as, ceteris paribus, they will be better informed. However, this positive
spillover effect will be offset by the benefits that follow from being better informed than anyone
else. Ceteris paribus, an entrepreneur will be better informed than anyone else the higher the level
of networking she undertakes herself and the lower the level of networking undertaken by others.
Networks may improve entrepreneurs’ access to information about the world even when their3
primary function is to reduce uncertainty. However, where uncertainty reduction is paramount
the ability of the network to act as a conduit for information about technologies and markets may
be compromised. 
Much of the uncertainty facing enterprises in sub-Saharan Africa is due to a lack of contract
discipline, leading in turn to delayed supplies, unreliable quality, and late payments and
repayments by customers and debtors. However, as Fafchamps (1996) explains, these problems
are ‘less the consequence of opportunism and carelessness than of poverty and unanticipated
income fluctuations. Shortages of critical inputs, delays in payment by their own customers, and
difficulties in transport render firms unable to pay on time or to deliver the quantity and quality
promised. Poor contractual performance tends to ripple through the system’ (p. 428). In such an
environment entrepreneurs need to be flexible when dealing with trading partners, creditors and
debtors. However, they also need to be able to distinguish between unavoidable poor contractual
performance and poor contractual performance due to incompetence or malfeasance. The problem
here is one of information asymmetries that can lead to high, unavoidable transaction costs
Platteau (1994a, 1994b). In more developed countries a plethora of formal market-supporting
institutions have emerged that, in combination with general trends in development, have reduced
uncertainties, improved contract discipline, and lowered both information asymmetries and the
resulting transactions costs. In sub-Saharan Africa, while many similar institutions exist, they tend
not to permeate the environment within which most enterprises operate. Instead, entrepreneurs
rely on their networks to reduce information asymmetries by facilitating flows of information
about the previous conduct, current circumstances and future intensions of their trading partners,
debtors and creditors (Fafchamps, 1996b). Hence, these networks provide a basis for trade, credit
and insurance.
Credit and insurance are very important in environments characterized by high levels of
uncertainty, and yet the markets for these services are among those most severely affected by poor
contract discipline and information asymmetries. It is in these markets that we most readily
observe differences in the institutional environments within which different types of African
enterprise operate. Formal lines of credit are available, but only to those with collateral, i.e., those
who already have accumulated assets and who operate in an environment characterised by well
defined property rights. Formal insurance also requires that property rights be well defined.
Informal credit and insurance arrangements can work in the absence of formal institutions such
as well defined property rights, but are just as vulnerable to problems of information asymmetry
as their formal counterparts (Udry, 1994). However, unlike those formal counterparts, informal
arrangements can be supported by networks (Fafchamps, 1992). 
Having established that networks can help substitute for formal market-supporting institutions by
allowing information about agents to flow, I wish to argue that in order to fulfil this role they need
to assume a particular structure. Ceteris paribus, risk-sharing and informal credit arrangements
are more efficient the larger and more diverse the group (Alderman and Paxson, 1994). This
notwithstanding, as the group and hence the network increases in size, so too does the number
of agents about whom each member has to keep informed. At some finite network size it is likely
that the costs associated with the need to assimilate information about an additional network  Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990) and Grief (1993) use game theory to draw similar conclusions.
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member will outweigh the benefits.  Increasing the diversity of the network also increases the cost
1
of collecting the required information. This is because it becomes harder for each member to
establish the standing of others based on the observations she can make. If diversity relates to
geographical location it is the cost of observing that increases. If diversity relates to activity the
problem is one of interpretation. It is for these reasons that Posner (1980) expects sharing
arrangements to be confined to groups of people with ‘broadly similar abilities, propensities,
character, and prospects’ (p. 12). Posner also emphasises the need for continual interaction if
information asymmetries are to be effectively reduced. This need may further suppress the optimal
size and diversity of the network, as time constraints will lead to a tradeoff between these
dimensions and the level of interaction with each contact.
Table 1: Network Function, Structure and Effect on Enterprise Performance
Innovation Network Solidarity Network
Network function to enhance enterprise to reduce uncertainty
performance
Type of information flowing about the world, about about member’s conduct,
through the network technologies and markets circumstances and
intensions
Characteristics of the sets of large, diverse, relatively small, homogeneous, high
contacts maintained by infrequent interaction with levels of interaction with
network members  each contact each contact
Overall effect on current relatively large relatively small
enterprise performance
Return on own networking a high proportion of the a low proportion of the
activity overall effect overall effect
Spillover effects of a low proportion of the a high proportion of overall
networking  overall effect effect
Typical member enterprise  larger enterprises with smaller enterprises with no
access to formal institutions access to formal institutions
A network ideally suited to reducing uncertainty is significantly different from one that provides
a high degree of access to information about the world. An uncertainty reducing network may
enhance enterprise performance indirectly. Lower levels of uncertainty have been linked with
higher levels of investment (Pattillo, 1997), while informal credit arrangements can be used to
overcome capital constraints. However, in general we would expect such a network to have a
positive effect on welfare, while having little or no effect on enterprise performance. This is
primarily because of the way in which the need to rely on networks to reduce uncertainty affects
the relative importance of the private and spillover effects of networking. A network is useful in
the context of uncertainty reduction because it makes it hard to keep secrets. But if members are  Both surveys were funded by the British Government. The RPED was a World Bank project under which the
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Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), University of Oxford, and the Department of Economics,
University of Legon, conducted the Ghanaian survey. The GMES was conducted by the CSAE and the Ghanaian
Statistical Service.
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unable to keep secrets about themselves, they will also find it difficult to keep secrets about
technological and market developments. Hence, the greater the extent to which a network is
required to reduce uncertainty, the greater the importance of spillovers in the overall impact of
the network on enterprise performance. Further, the members of this type of network may have
difficulty excluding others from the returns relating not only to their networking activity but to
many other activities including investments in physical capital and all forms of innovation. This
may act as a disincentive, making it less likely that the members of such networks will take steps
to improve the current and future performance of their enterprises (Posner, 1980).
The preceding discussion about the best types of network for enhancing enterprise performance
and reducing uncertainty is summarized in Table 1. Here, networks that enhance enterprise
performance by allowing information about the world to flow between their members have been
labelled ‘innovation networks’. While those designed to reduce uncertainty by allowing
information about agents to flow have been labelled ‘solidarity networks’ (Fafchamps, 1992). The
final row of the table indicates the type of enterprises that we are most likely to find in the two
forms of network. In innovation networks we are likely to find larger enterprises as they tend to
operate within environments at least partially regulated by formal, market-supporting institutions
and have access to formal lines of credit and insurance. Larger enterprises, as well as having less
to loose, may also have more to gain from maintaining innovation rather than a solidarity
networks as they employ rapidly evolving technologies and serve a potentially diverse set of
markets. In solidarity networks we are more likely to find enterprises that have restricted access
to and operate within an environment unregulated by formal, market-supporting institutions, who
employ traditional, static technologies and sell primarily to end users in local markets. Smaller
enterprises generally display these characteristics. 
4. Empirical Analysis
We can investigate the theoretical linkages in Table 1 using data from the Ghanaian manufacturing
sector. Much of the data required to conduct this investigation can be drawn from the Ghanaian
Regional Program for Enterprise Development (RPED) survey and its successor, the Ghanaian
Manufacturing Enterprise Survey (GMES).  While these surveys contain a wide range of data
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about manufacturing enterprises, their employees and the environment in which they operate, the
original questionnaire did not address the issue of enterprise networks. To remedy this the author
designed a supplementary questionnaire that was administered first in 1994 and again in 1996.
Due to the absence of a good frame the sample of enterprises cannot be described as random.
Larger enterprises are known to be over-represented, while small and micro enterprises are
significantly under-represented. As a result we need to be cautious when drawing conclusions
from the data about the Ghanaian manufacturing sector as a whole. This notwithstanding, the data
is ideal for making comparisons between different types of enterprise.
In the supplementary networking questionnaire the respondents were asked how many contacts  In order to maximize the sample size corporate enterprises were not excluded. In these cases the managing
3
director was the respondent to the network module of the questionnaire.
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they maintained in each of nine categories. Six of these related to other businesspeople in the same
line of business, in different lines of business, with larger businesses, in other regions of Ghana,
non-Ghanaians based in Ghana, and in other countries. The remaining three related to bankers,
public servants, and politicians. In the following analysis the networking activity of each
entrepreneur is captured by the number of contacts they purport to maintain.  The questionnaire
3
design also facilitated the construction of a variable relating to the networking activity of the
respondents’ co-networkers. Starting with the entire sample of enterprises, for each respondent,
a sub-sample corresponding to the description of her contacts is drawn. The average number of
contacts maintained by this sub-sample is then used as a proxy for the level of networking
undertaken by each respondent’s co-networkers. The inclusion of this variable in the analysis
allows us to separate the private from the spillover effects of networking. To identify the type of
network to which each entrepreneur belongs we use three variables: the diversity of their contacts,
defined as the number of categories within which they have at least one contact; the average
frequency of liaison between the entrepreneur and her contacts (available only for a sub-sample);
and the proportion of her contacts that an entrepreneur expects would help her in a crisis
(available only for a sub-sample).
The characteristics of small enterprises (up to thirty employees) and large enterprises (more than
thirty employees), with particular reference to their institutional environments, markets,
technologies and networks, are presented in Table 2. The only information we have on the
institutional environment within which the enterprises operate relates to whether they use formal
sources of credit and insurance — small enterprises are significantly less likely to use formal
sources of credit or to formally insure their capital stock. Our best indicator of potential market
diversity relates to actual market diversity — small enterprises are far more likely to supply only
end users. In production, small enterprises employ relatively labour-intensive technologies and are
less likely to use electrically powered tools. In addition, their workforces are significantly less
educated and experienced. All of these indicators suggest that small enterprises have less to gain
and more to loose from maintaining large, diverse innovation networks. We would expect them
to build the type of networks that can substitute for formal market-supporting institutions and
help them cope with potential information asymmetries, i.e., relatively small, homogeneous and
cohesive solidarity networks. In contrast, larger enterprises have reasonable access to formal
institutions and may have more to gain from large, diverse innovation networks. The third part
of Table 2 contains several indicators relating to the types of networks that small and large
enterprises maintain. In line with our expectations, small enterprises maintain only one third of the
contacts maintained by larger enterprises and liaise far more frequently (more than twice rather
than less than once a week) with each. As well as being smaller, their networks are less diverse
and are made up of co-networkers who also maintain small networks. Finally, they expect that a
greater (although not significantly greater) proportion of their contacts will assist them in a crisis.7
Table 2: Characteristics of small and large enterprises and their networks
a
1 - 30 > 30 employees Significance of All enterprises
employees difference
Institutional Environment
Percentage of enterprises with a 17.78% 75.00% *** 32.79%
formal loan or overdraft
Percentage of enterprises that 0.88% 64.29% *** 25.00%
insure their capital stock
#
Markets and Technologies
Percentage of enterprises 41.11% 18.75% ** 35.25%
supplying to end users only
Mean capital-labour ratio 1,861 6,078 *** 2,967
Percentage of enterprises using 62.22% 90.63% *** 69.67%
electrically powered tools
Mean years of formal education of 9.06 11.00 *** 9.57
workforce
Mean years of work experience of 5.20 10.05 *** 6.47
workforce
Networks
Mean number of contacts 33.48 92.41 ** 48.93
Mean diversity of contacts 3.53 5.91 *** 4.16
Mean number of liaisons with an 107.82 50.17 *** 93.04
average contact per year
#
Mean number of contacts of the 38.57 63.03 *** 44.98
entrepreneurs’ co-networkers
Percentage of contacts who would 23.20% 14.12% 21.95%
assist in a crisis
#
Number of enterprises 90 32 122
#
 The table is constructed using 1993 data. The capital-labour ratio is reported in thousands of Cedi.
a
** Means significantly different at 5% level. 
*** Means significantly different at 1% level. 
# Insurance variable available for 68 small and 28 large enterprises, liaisons variable available for 87 small and
30 large enterprise, assistance in a crisis variable available for 63 small and 10 large enterprises. 
We can learn more about what motivates different entrepreneurs to build different types of
networks by introducing the variables in Table 2 into a set of simple regressions that take contact
diversity, frequency of liaison and the expectation of help in a crisis as their dependent variables.
The results of these regressions, which have been conducted using ordinary least squares should
be thought of as correlations rather than estimates of fully specified models of network
determination. This is particularly important when looking at the coefficients on our two8
indicators relating to the use of formal market-supporting institutions. Our theory identifies formal
institutions and solidarity networks as substitutes: it follows that network structure and the use
of formal institutions are simultaneously determined. 
Table 3: Regression analysis of network characteristics
a
Dependent Variable Diversity  Frequency  Proportion of contacts
of  of  who would help in a
contacts liaison crisis
Constant 2.3832*** 99.1400*** 0.2893***
(0.52) (18.24) (0.06)
Number of employees 0.0043** - 0.1630** - 0.0005
(0.002) (0.07) (0.001)
Formal loan or overdraft 0.7146** - 47.5000*** - 0.1130***
(0.33) (10.19) (0.03)
Formally insure capital 1.6271*** - 0.5327 0.0544
(0.32) (14.50) (0.06)
Supply end users only  0.0013*** - 0.0196 - 0.0001**
(0.0004) (0.03) (0.00003)
Capital-labour ratio 0.0624*** - 0.2728 - 0.0026**
(millions of Cedi / worker) (0.01) (0.73) (0.001)
Electrically powered tools 0.4439* - 13.5020 - 0.0923***
(0.23) (9.81) (0.03)
Mean years of formal 0.0696 1.7794 - 0.0028
education of workforce (0.05) (1.44) (0.006)
Mean years of work experience -0.0371*** 0.7758  0.0030
of workforce (0.01) (0.67) (0.003)
Number of observations 411 381 271
Adjusted R 0.3287 0.0788 0.0580
2
 Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. All regressions contain three year
a
dummies.
* Significant at 10% level. 
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
The high probability of simultaneity bias notwithstanding, the results of the regression analysis are
revealing. The number of employees is included in the regressions primarily as a control variable.
However, it is interesting to note that large enterprises tend to have more diverse sets of contacts
and liaise less frequently with each. It is also interesting to note that after controlling for
institutional environment, market diversity and technology, enterprise size and the proportion of
her contacts from whom an entrepreneur expects help are uncorrelated. Entrepreneurs who use
formal sources of credit are likely to have significantly more diverse sets of contacts, to liaise
significantly less often with each contact, and to expect a significantly lower proportion of their
contacts to help them in a time of crisis. Entrepreneurs who formally insure their capital stocks
are also likely to have more diverse sets of contacts. However, there is no significant correlation9
between the use of formal insurance and the other two indicators of network type. This may be
due to the high degree of collinearity among the right hand side variables. The results relating to
whether entrepreneurs supply only end users are not in line with our expectations. Those
supplying only end users are likely to have more diverse sets of contacts and to expect a lower
proportion of them to help in a crisis. These results may be reflecting the difference between
potential and actual market diversity. It may be that entrepreneurs choose to supply only end users
as an alternative uncertainty reducing strategy. End users tend to buy from existing stock or to
place only small orders and they generally pay cash prior to or on delivery. By avoiding problems
relating to information asymmetries in this way entrepreneurs may reduce their need to rely on
solidarity networks. Turning to our technological indicators we find that more capital intensive
enterprises have significantly more diverse sets of contacts a lower proportion of whom they
expect to help them in a crisis. The results relating to the use of electrically powered tools are
similar. After controlling for these two technological indicators the level of worker education is
not significant, while worker experience is significantly correlated with only the diversity of
contacts. Contrary to our expectations, this correlation is negative. This may be because
entrepreneurs treat experienced workers and networks as substitutes, but is more likely to be a
symptom of collinearity.
By estimating several fully specified productivity equations we can investigate whether there is
a link between network type and the effect of networking on enterprise performance. The
productivity equations are estimated using a sample pooled over the four years from 1992 to 1995
and take value-added per worker as their dependent variable. To isolate the effect of networks
we must control for several other factors including the number of employees, the capital-labour
ratio, and the years of formal education and work experience of an average employee. The
equations also include a dummy for corporate enterprises, three annual dummies and five sub-
sectoral dummies. Networking activity is captured by the number of contacts maintained by the
entrepreneur and the average number of contacts maintained by her co-networkers. In order to
look at whether the effects of networking vary depending on the type of network we introduce
six interaction terms into the regression equations. These take the two base networking variables
and multiply them by each of our three indicators of network type, contact diversity, frequency
of liaison and expectations of help. All of the regressions are conducted using ordinary least
squares, as there is a dearth of good, valid instrumental variables in the RPED data set. So, once
again we must be aware of the possibility of simultaneity bias in the estimated coefficients on the
right-hand side variables. 
Let us look first at the results relating to labour and physical and human capital. The coefficient
relating to the number of employees is insignificant in all of the estimated equations indicating that
the returns to scale on labour and physical capital are constant. The coefficient relating to the
capital-labour ratio and the human capital variables remain stable following the introduction of
the various network variables, except in the final column where the change in sample causes some
variation. A one percent increase in the amount of capital per worker corresponds to a 0.14 to
0.18 percent increase in productivity. The effects of worker education and experience on
productivity are non-linear. The marginal returns to worker education increase, while the marginal
returns to worker experience diminish.10
Table 4: Estimated productivity equations
a
No network Network effects Network effects assumed to differ
variables assumed the between network types 
same for all
network types (a) (b)
Constant 10.4890*** 10.1690*** 10.6860*** 10.6760***
(0.44) (0.46) (0.46) (0.65)
Ln (number of  0.0247 - 0.0396 - 0.0428  - 0.1274
  employees) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Ln (capital-labour 0.1854*** 0.1746*** 0.1648*** 0.1376***
  ratio) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Average years of  - 0.2116*** - 0.1838*** - 0.1795*** - 0.0637
  education (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Square of years of  0.0144*** 0.0122*** 0.0117*** 0.0023
  education (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Average years of  0.0517*** 0.0557*** 0.0464** 0.0442**
  experience (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Square of years of  - 0.0012*** - 0.0012*** - 0.0010** - 0.0010**
  experience (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Ln (own networking) ---- 0.0891** - 0.2052** - 0.0443
(0.05) (0.09) (0.16)
Ln (others’ networking) ---- 0.0840 0.1730** 0.1260
(0.06) (0.08) (0.12)
Contact diversity × ---- ---- 0.0548*** 0.0596***
  Ln (own networking) (0.02) (0.02)
Contact diversity × ---- ---- - 0.0330** - 0.0415**
  Ln( others’ networking) (0.02) (0.02)
Frequency of liaison × ---- ---- ---- - 0.0013**
  Ln (own networking) (0.0005)
Frequency of liaison × ---- ---- ----  0.0012***
  Ln( others’ networking) (0.0004)
Help in a crisis × ---- ---- ---- - 0.2335
  Ln (own networking) (0.25)
Help in a crisis × ---- ---- ----  0.2732*
  Ln( others’ networking) (0.16)
Number of observations 494 494 494 306
Adjusted R 0.3351 0.3541 0.3629  0.2859
2
 Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. All regressions contain three year
a
dummies, a dummy for corporate enterprises, and five sectoral dummies.
* Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.11
The equation in the second column has been estimated under the assumption that the effects of
networking are the same within all types of network. It reveals that, on average, enterprises
benefit from their own networking activity. The coefficient on this variable is significant at the five
percent level and suggests that a one percent increase in the number of contacts an entrepreneur
maintains corresponds to a 0.09 percent increase in productivity. The coefficient relating to the
networking activity of the entrepreneur’s co-networkers is positive but poorly defined. The results
in the third and fourth columns indicate that this is because nature of the spillover effects varies
significantly depending on the type of network an entrepreneur maintains.
Two equations have been estimated that take account of variations in the effects of different types
of network. In the first, (a), only contact diversity is used to capture different types of network.
This regression shows that the effects of increasing numbers of contacts maintained vary
depending on how diverse the contacts are. When an entrepreneur’s contacts are more diverse
the effect of her increasing the number of contacts she maintains will be larger, while the effect
of her co-networkers increasing the number of contacts they maintain will be smaller, i.e., the
more diverse the network the larger the private effect and the smaller the spillover effects of
networking. These results are confirmed by the equation in the final column. In this equation the
frequency of liaison and the expectation of help are also taken into account, even though this
severely reduces the size of the sample with which we can work (from 494 to 306 observations).
In spite of the high degree of collinearity between them, five out of the six resulting interaction
terms are significant. As before, increases in contact diversity are associated with increases in the
private and declines in the spillover effects of networking. Increases in both the frequency of
liaison and the expectation of help are associated with declines in the private and increases in the
spillover effects of networking.
The economic significance of these interaction effects is best demonstrated by calculating the
private and spillover effects of networking for different types of network and enterprise. We have
characterized a solidarity network as small and homogeneous with a high level of interaction and
the capacity to support informal risk-sharing arrangements, while an innovation network is large
and diverse with a low level of interaction and no capacity to support such arrangements. Now,
we need to assign a particular level of diversity, frequency of liaison and expectation of help to
each. To avoid being totally arbitrary, I shall define a solidarity-type network as one in which the
diversity of contacts is one standard deviation below its mean (1.67) and the frequency of liaison
and expectation of help are both one standard deviation above their means (182.23 and 0.49
respectively). By the same logic, an innovation-type network is defined as one in which the
diversity of contacts is one standard deviation above its mean (6.64) and the frequency of liaison
and expectation of help are both one standard deviation below their means (3.85 and zero
respectively). We can then calculated the private, spillover and overall effects of networking
within the two types of network.
The results of this exercise are presented in the first two columns of Table 5. Each of the numbers
presented is an elasticity. The ‘private effect’ indicates the percentage rise in the productivity of
an entrepreneur’s workforce corresponding to a one percent increase in the number of contacts
she maintains. The ‘spillover effects’ indicate the percentage rise in the productivity of an
entrepreneur’s workforce corresponding to a one percent increase in the number of contacts her
co-networkers maintain. The ‘overall effect’ indicates the percentage rise in productivity
corresponding to a one percent increase in both the number of contacts maintained by the12
entrepreneur and her co-networkers. The pattern of effects across the two types of network
conforms closely to our expectations. Note first that while the overall effect of networking is
positive within both network types, within the solidarity-type network it is half the size and not
significantly different from zero. Looking at the breakdown of the overall effect into the private
and spillover effects we find that in the innovation-type network the private effect is positive and
high (approximately two times the effect of increasing physical capital by a corresponding
amount), while the spillover effects are not significantly different from zero. In contrast, in the
solidarity-type network the spillover effects are both high and significantly different from zero,
while the private effect is significantly negative. This negative private effect can be explained by
pointing out that we have not controlled for the cost of networking in the estimated productivity
equations. In the absence of such a control, the private effect of networking is estimated net of
costs.  The negative private effect implies that the costs of networking outweigh the private
benefits. 
Table 5: The private and spillover effects of networking in different types of network
Innovation-type Solidarity-type Average  Average 
network network large enterprise small enterprise
Private effect 0.3466*** - 0.3015** 0.2086** - 0.0312
Spillover effects - 0.1448 0.4021*** - 0.0223 0.1680**
Overall effect 0.2018** 0.1006 0.1863** 0.1368
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
The last two columns of Table 5 report the results of another set of calculations in which the
diversity of contacts, the frequency of liaison and the expectation of help are set at the averages
reported for small and large enterprises in Table 2. As a result of this exercise we see that because
of the type of networks they build, the overall effect of networking activity on large enterprises
is positive and significant, while the corresponding effect on small enterprises is not significantly
different from zero. The private effect of networking is positive and significant for large
enterprises, but again not significantly different from zero for small enterprises.  In contrast, it is
only the small enterprises that benefit from significant positive spillover effects. 
5. Conclusions
The results of the empirical analysis are consistent with the proposition that networks affect
enterprise performance in different ways and to different extents depending on the function they
are built to perform. These differences arise because alternative network structures suit alternative
functions. Entrepreneurs with larger enterprises tend to maintain innovation networks that are
large, diverse, less cohesive and best suited to providing access to information about technology
and markets. In contrast, entrepreneurs with smaller enterprises tend to maintain solidarity
networks that are small, homogeneous, cohesive and best suited to reducing information
asymmetries and thus supporting informal credit and risk-sharing arrangements. While these
solidarity networks may have a marginal effect on enterprise productivity, it is the more far-
reaching, innovation networks that have a large and significant impact. It is not only the overall13
effect of networking that varies, the nature and relative importance of the private and spillover
effects also depend on the role and consequent structure of the network. Solidarity networks tend
to generate significant positive spillovers; within their bounds it is difficult for individuals to
exclude others from the benefits of their own networking activity. On the other hand, the
innovation networks to which large enterprises belong tend to generate high private returns. While
compelling, these results must be viewed with some caution. Due to data constraints, we have not
been able to rule out the possibility of simultaneity bias. 
Policy makers are becoming increasingly interested in the concept of social capital. The results
presented in this paper suggest that caution needs to be exercised in this area. Traditionally,
spillover effects have been viewed as a rationale for policy intervention, with positive spillovers
being taken a sign that some form of subsidy or fostering intervention is in order. Above, we
found evidence of positive spillovers only within the solidarity networks built by smaller
enterprises. However, encouraging networking of this type, while improving entrepreneurs’ ability
to cope with uncertainty, may lead to the suppression of innovative activity. In addition, for other
types of enterprise with different networking objectives we cannot rule out the possibility of
negative spillover effects relating to networking activities. Given that the overall effect of
networking on enterprise performance is significant only in innovation networks we might be
tempted to encourage all enterprises to expand and diversify their sets of contacts. This, however,
could leave many enterprises more vulnerable to the effects of uncertainty, as it could compromise
their networks’ ability to reduce information asymmetries and support informal credit and risk-
sharing arrangements. Efforts to strengthen formal market-supporting institutions and make them
more accessible to small enterprises might be a more fruitful policy objective. Future research into
the role of social capital in the form of enterprise networks in determining economic outcomes
may suggest appropriate policy interventions, but at present our overriding aim should be to do
no harm. 14
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